Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1955

United States of America v. Provo Bench Canal and
Irrigation Company et al : Brief of Appellant, State
Engineer of the State of Utah
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; Robert B. Porter; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, US v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co., No. 8391 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2406

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

A~:·-·~lVE[

IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH~~,.~~

19

L~ .. i_:,;,i~R~

U. ot U.
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation;
· -.:.·.....
-· · . ..c:-u.
.\
TIMPANOGOS CANAL COMPANY,
..~
I
a corporation; UPPER EAST UNION ~ ~L:
~
CANAL COMPANY, a corpora~n; l
~..J .- . ~· 1'J
WEST UNt~ON ECAASNTALRICVOEMRPAB Y, t -r 0 \) \~}:.;
~--~---""
a corpora 1on;
, i ~' •·· ............ ---.~··\:.~-~·
TOM WATER COMPANY, a corpora_. . co"\t~'
tion; FORT FIELD IRRIGATION
_............ "'ef{}e
COMPANY, a corporation; LITTLE~-/~\'.· s ...v·
DRY CREEK IRRIGATION COM- _.;e
PANY, a corporation; SMITH DITCH
COMPANY, an unincorporated assoCases
ciation; FAUCETT FIELD DITCH
Nos. 8390
COMPANY, an unincorporated association; RIVERSIDE IRRIGATION
and 8391.
COMPANY, an unincorporated association; and PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs. HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer
of the State of Utah (Successor in
office of Ed. H. Watson, former State
Engineer of the State of Utah) and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
through its Bureau of Reclamation,
Department of the Interior,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, STATE ENGINEER
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

ROBERT B. PORTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant,
State Engineer

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................ 1-5
STATEMENT OF POINTS ...................................................................... 5-6
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................. 6-29
POINT I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
AND CONCLUDING THAT CERTAIN DECREE MADE
AND ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, CIVIL NO. 2888, AND COMMONLY REFERRED
TO AS THE PROVO RIVER DECREE, WAS RES ADJUDICATA AND BINDING UPON THE DEFENDANT
UNITED STATES AND PREVENTED THE APPROVAL
OF THE CHANGE APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE
UNITED STATES; BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE
CHANGE APPLICATIONS WERE ENTITLED TO BE
APPROVED AND THE APPLICANT PERMITTED TO
PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN. THE ERROR HERE
CLAIMED IS DIRECTED AT FINDINGS NOS. 17, 18,
AND 19 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15462 AND AT FINDINGS
NO. 15463 IN THE COURT BELOW AND AT CONCLUSION NO.3 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 3 OF
THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES IN THE COURT
BELOW................................................................................................. 6-16
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT RECEIVED EVIDENCE AND MADE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN EXCESS OF ITS POWER SO TO DO AND ENTERED
JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY, THAT CONCLUSION NO.
4 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 4 OF THE
JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES BELOW ARE ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE ISSUES
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED AND
HEARD BY THE STATE ENGINEER AND THEREFORE ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT................................................................................. 16-28
CONCLUSION .................................................................... ........................

29

STATUTES AND TEXTS CITED
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953..........................................

7

Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953............ ...........................

16

Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953........................................

16

Hutchins on Law of Water Rights, page 278......................................

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED

Page

American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, (Utah), 239 P. 2d 188......

11

Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362 ...................................... 17-18
East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co.,
2 U. 2d 170,271 P. 2d 449 ................................................................ 8-12
Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 892................

11

Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co.,
104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108, rehearing denied
104 Utah 216, 140 P. 2d 638..............................................................

10

Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Assn.,
2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P. 2d 453............................................................

12

Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957.................................. 18-20
United States v. District Court, (Utah), 238 P. 2d 1132.... 2-14-15-17-23
United States v. District Court, (Utah), 242 P. 2d 774................ 2-17-24
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748.................. 18-21
Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954..............................

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation;
TIMPANOGOS CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation; UPPER EAST UNION
CANAL COMPANY, a corporation;
WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation; EAST RIVER BOTTOM WATER COMPANY, a corporation; FORT FIELD IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation; LITTLE
DRY CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; SMITH DITCH
COMPANY, an unincorporated association; FAUCETT FIELD DITCH
COMPANY, an unincorporated association; RIVERSIDE IRRIGATION
COMPANY, an unincorporated association; and PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation,

Cases
Nos. 8390
and 8391.

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs. HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer
of the State of Utah (Successor in
office of Ed. H. Watson, former State
Engineer of the State of Utah) and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
through its Bureau of Reclamation,
Department of the Interior,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, STATE ENGINEER
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STA~rEMENT

OF

FAC~rS

The record in this case is voluminous, consisting of
some 1200 pages of reported testimony in addition to
many exhibits and numerous pleadings; but, for the
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purpose of this appeal by the State Engineer, only the
complaint of the plaintiffs and the findings, conclusions
and judgment of the trial court are of importance. They
are found at R. 5 to 19 in Case No. 8390 and R. 5 to 19
in Case No. 8391, and R. 242 to 262 in Case No. 8390
and R. 229 to 248 in Case No. 8391, respectively.
This case came before this Court once before upon
petition of the United States for an extraordinary writ
to prevent the District Court from taking jurisdiction
on the ground of the sovereign immunity of the United
States. This Court denied the writ in United States v.
District Court, 238 P. 2d 1132; and, a petition for rehearing was denied and this opinion is reported at 242 P. 2d
77 4 and at page 777 of 242 Pacific Reporter 2nd Series
this Court said: "We know of no case of an appeal from
the decision of an executive board or officer where the
appellate trjbunal adjudicates new issues not within the
jurisdiction of the original tribunal to determine.''
For the purpose of this appeal the necessary facts
are almost matters of common knowledge among the
citizens of this state. The United States through its
Bureau of Reclamation constructed the Deer Creek
Reservoir on the Provo River and contracted with the
Provo River Water Users Association for repayment of
the cost thereof. Stockholders in this Association are the
~Ietropolitan Water Districts of the following municipalities: Salt Lake City, Orem, Provo, Lehi, American Fork
and Pleasant Grove-Linden, as well as irrigation companies, some of whom are as follows: Provo Reservoir
Water Users Company, Utah Lake Distributing Com2
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pa11y, Hewlett Ranches, Victory Ranches, Provo Bench

Canal and Irrigation Company (one of the plaintiffs in
the present action), Dixon Irrigation Company, Washington Irrigation Company, South Kamas Irrigation Company and Beaver and Shingle Creek Irrigation Company.
Prior to construction it was necessary to obtain title to
those lands that would be inundated by the reservoir
and, in so obtaining title the United States also purchased
some 50 c.f.s. of water that had been awarded those
lands under the Provo River decree. As in most river
systems in this state, the return flow was important and
the decree tied the seepage or drainage to the land for
the benefit and protection of the lower users.
The United States through its Bureau of Reclamation filed with the State Engineer of Utah an application
to change the place and nature of use of this 50 second
feet, ·whieh amount was reduced by amendment during
the hearing before the State Engineer to approximately
12.5 second feet, and thereupon the State Engineer
approved this change application. This amount was
further reduced during the trial to 1.54 c.f.s. and 7.9
c.f.s., respectively, or a total of 9.33 second feet. Paragraphs 11 and 12, and 13, respectively, of the Findings
of Fact specifically show the action of the trial court
in this regard. We should place emphasis upon the
fact that we are concerned \vith n change application
and not a savings application although the word savings is often used in the record, and we shall more
thoroughly cover this point during the part of this brief
devoted to argument. The Findings above referred to
are of sufficient importance to be quoted here and read
3
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as follows: ''That the defendant, the United States of
America, acquired for the Provo River Project, the land
now comprising the Deer Creek Reservoir site, and certain water rights appurtenant thereto aggregating 9.20
second feet, as specifically described in Exhibit A to said
application No. a-1902, and by reference made a part
hereof; subject, however, to that certain decree of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State
of Utah, generally known and referred to as No. 2888,
and herein referred to as such.''
''That prior to the construction of Deer Creek Reservoir, the owners of the land in said reservoir site diverted
43.292 second feet of water from the Provo River and
tributaries under and by virtue of the rights described
in said Exhibit A of application a-1902, was amended by
the State Engineer's office, by which amendment it was
proposed to change the point of diversion, place and
nature of use of said 10.30 second feet of water from
the land in the Deer Creek Reservoir site to the Provo
River Project land described in Exhibit C to said application a-1902; that during the trial it was stipulated that
a portion of the land described in said application lies
above the flow line of the reservoir and that the water
rights appurtenant thereto should be eliminated from
the application and that by reason thereof the water
right sought to be changed should be reduced from
10.30 to 7.9 second feet; that under the pre-reservoir
conditions said 7.9 second feet of water was lost to the
river and was consumed by evaporation and plant life."
And finally we should stress that paragraphs 12 and
4
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13, respectively, of the Findings of Fact found that the
said 9.33 second feet of water "under prereservoir conditions ... was lost to the river and was consumed by
evaporation and plant life." It is the United State's
application to change the place and nature of use of this
9.33 second feet with which we are concerned here.
The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to introduce
evidence concerning a fault zone passing across the
reservoir area, concerning brecciated conditions on the
floor and sides of the reservoir, concerning increased
pressure of water on the fault zone and brecciated areas,
concerning bank storage and concerning the raising of
the water table around the perimeter of the reservoir.
The trial court made findings and conclusions as to these
matters and embodied them in paragraph numbered four
in the judgment in each case below. To the introduction
of this evidence, proper objection was timely made.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRI~D IN FINDING
AND CONCLUDING r:rHAT CERTAIN DECREE
l\IADE AND ENTERED IN 'THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DIS1'RICT COURT IN AND :B-,OR urrAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO. 2888, AND
COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE PROVO
RIVER DECHEE, \VAS Hl1~~< ,\D.TUDICAT;\ AXD
BINDING UPON THE DEFENDANT UNITED
STATES AXD PREVENTI1JD 1'H1~ APPROVAL OF
THE UHANOE APPLlUArriO:\S FILJ1JD BY rl'HE
UNITED STATE~; BUT ON rrHE CONTRARY TH:BJ
CHANGE APPLICATIONS W:B~RE ENTrrLED TO
BE APPROVED AND THE APPLICANrr P:BJRJ\IIIT5
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·rED TO PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN. THE ERROR
HERE CLAIMED IS DIRECTED AT FINDINGS
NOS. 17, 18, AND 19 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15462 AND
AT FINDINGS NOS. 18, 19 AND 20 IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 15463 IN THE COURT BELOW AND AT CONCLUSION NO. 3 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 3 OF THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES
IN THE COURT BELOW.
POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT RECEIVED EVIDENCE
AND MADE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN
EXCESS OF ITS POWER SO TO DO AND ENTERED
JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY. THAT CONCLUSION
NO. 4 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 4 OF
THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES BELOW ARE
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE
ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED AND HEARD BY THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THEREFORE ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
AND CONCLUDING THAT CERTAIN DECREE
MADE AND ENTERED IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO. 2888, AND
COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE PROVO
RIVER DECREE, WAS RES ADJUDICATA AND
BINDING UPON THE DEFENDANT UNITED
STATES AND PREVENTED THE APPROVAL OF
THE CHANGE APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE
UNITED STATES; BUT ON THE CONTRARY THE
CHANGE APPLICATIONS WERE ENTITLED TO
6
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BE APPROVED AND THE APPLICANT PERMITTED r_ro PROCEED WITH ITS PLAN. THE ERROR
HERE CLAIMED IS DIRECTED AT FINDINGS
NOS. 17, 18, AND 19 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15462 AND
A'r FINDINGS NOS. 18, 19 AND 20 IN CIVIL CASE
l\0. 154G3 I~ THE COURT BELO\V AND AT CON- •
CLUSION NO. 3 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERED 3 OF THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH CASES
IN THE COURT BELOW.
The trial court has in effect stated that a change
application may not be approved if the water in question
is the subject of a decree that has tied it to certain lands;
and paragraph 3 of the judgment of the trial court
recites that the United States is bound by the Provo
River Decree, that the waters of said river cannot be
"used upon any land other than that then irrigated at
the time of the entry of said decree so as to cause any
of the seepage or drainage therefrom to be diverted
away from the channel of Provo River or from the lands
theretofore irrigated thereby; and that any water theretofore appurtenant to the lands inundated by said Deer
Creek Reservoir must be permitted to flow down Provo
River to satisfy the rights of lower users including
plaintiffs herein.'' ·vve respectfully submit that this
paragraph of the judgment is rontrary to the law of
this state and cannot be upheld.
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
Any person entitled to the use of water may
change the place of diversion or use and may use
the water for other purposes than those for which
it was originally appropriated, but no such change
7
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shall be made if it impairs any vested right without just compensation.
This section then details the manner and method by
which these changes may be accomplished in the State
Engineer's Office.
And this statute has been interpreted and stated
in the negative by this Court in East Bench Irrigation
Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 U. 2d 170, 271 P. 2d 449,
as follows:
Thus a change in place of diversion or the place
or nature of use or a combination of such changes
cannot be made if the lower users, whether prior
or subsequent to the rights of the parties making
the change, will thereby be deprived of the use of
water which they would have had under the use
which the upper appropriators made before the
change. Such a change would enlarge the rights
of the upper appropriators and impair the vested
rights of the lower users because their rights were
established on the basis that no such enlargement
or changes of use would be made after the lower
users had perfected their appropriation, and this
is true of storage as well as direct flow waters.
We should here emphasize two matters. First, the
Provo River decree contemplated that the upper users
could not make any changes in their practice that would
decrease the return flow and the decree so states and
this is consistent with the language quoted from the
East Bench case, supra. But, this does not mean that
any change is prohibited. The second point is the fact
that there is no finding that the proposed change would
impair the rights of the plaintiffs and an entire lack of
8
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1

31

1n

evidence to support such a finding if one were attempted
to be made.
We submit that change applications filed by water
users are entitled to grave consideration and should be
rejected only if it is clear and beyond question that the
rights of others will be impaired; and we will demonstrate that, even if other rights will be affected, change
applications should still be approved with conditions
attached to safeguard those rights of others. It should
be here noted that approval of change applications is
in no sense a final determination that the change will
not affect others; but rather it is a determination only
that the applicant may proceed with his proposed change
on the probability that he may do so without harm to
others.
Hutchins on the Law of Water Rights, at page 278,
says:
It has long been the general rule that the appropriator may change the point of his diversion of
water from the stream, or may change the place
of use or even the purpose of his use of the water,
so long as the rights of others are not thereby
impaired.

We believe that a brief review of the Utah cases on this
question will compel the conclusion that the trial court's
rejection of the change applications in <1nestion was 1n
error and cannot be sustained.

Changes in the manner and nature of use of water
are becoming and will continue to become of paramount
importance because of the rapidly diminishing supply
9
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of unappropriated water within the state; and a number
of rather recent cases have had occasion to discuss the
change application.
In Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108, rehearing
denied 104 Utah 216, 140 P. 2d 638, the Court approved
an application to change the place of storage from the
tributary to the main channel of the Beaver River.
Certain limitations were attached to the approval and
the Court indicated that the approval only gave the
applicant a right to proceed, and that the protesting
parties were not ''foreclosed from future actions for
damages or injunctive relief if Kents Lake does interfere with their rights."
In lVhitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P. 2d 954,
the Court called attention to the third paragraph of
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads
as follows:
Applications for either permanent or temporary
changes shall not be rejected for the sole reason
that such change would impair vested rights of
others, but if otherwise proper, they may be approved as to part of the water involved or upon
condition that such conflicting rights be acquired.
The Court then said :
If a change application must not be rejected
merely because there might be some conflict with
vested rights, it would seem to follow that an
original application should not be rejected when
there is unappropriated water and the only conflict is with respect to the point of return.
10
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The case of Lehi Irrigation Compa;ny v. Jones, 115
Utah 136, 202 P. 2d 892, although it deals with an application to appropriate rather than a change application,
does contain language that is particularly applicable to
all applications before the State Engineer and directs
their approval unless the evidence is clear and convincing that they must be rejected. The Court said:
To rule otherwise would be to foreclose the applicant in this case any opportunity to develop water
if it in fact exists, and would have the effect of
establishing a rule in this state not in conformity
with the announced policy of the state to liberally
construe rights toward the development and beneficial use of all waters of the state.
In American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke,
(Utah) 239 P. 2d 188, the irrigation company sought to
change a direct flow early season right to storage in a
dam for later use in irrigating more valuable later season
crops. The State Engineer rejected the application but
his action was reversed by the trial court which latter
action was affirmed by this Court, saying :
Plaintiffs' proposal, if completed without impairing vested rights, contemplates the more beneficial use of water, a most desired result fully consistent with progress and change, and reflecting
the established poliey of thiH state. In a very
Hcholarly and exhaust i V<' document, counsel for
defendants insist that plaintiffs' proposal most
certainly would invade uefendants' vested rights.
If, in executing the plan, the plaintiffs interfere
with or diminish the rights of others, a remedy
is available, particularly since the trial court approved the application subject to the rights of
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

others and ·without prejudice thereto, and sine('
approval of plaintiffs' application awards no
vested rights but simply allows them to proceed
with a plan specifically conditioned by the trial
court on respecting the rights of others. The
argument that this case may lead to multiplicity
of litigation is negatived when it is recognized
that each case must rest on its own peculiar facts.
Such argument should not foreclose the opportunity and duty to accomplish that optimum use
of water demanded in this arid region when it
appears, and the trial court found, and which we
believe the facts tend reasonably to indicate, that
defendants will not suffer by operation of the plan.
, And in a very recent case, Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Assn., 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P.
2d 453, a change application was approved in the following language :
If the evidence shows that there is reason to
believe that the proposed change can be made
without impairing vested rights the application
should be approved. The owner of a water right
has a vested right to the quality as well as the
quantity which he has beneficially used. A change
application cannot be rejected without a showing
that vested rights will thereby be substantially
impaired. While the applicant has the general
burden of showing that no impairment of vested
rights will result from the change, the person
opposing such application must fail if the evidence does not disclose that his rights will be
impaired.
And in East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., supra, this Court makes the following statement in connection with change applications:
12
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We conclude that the applications must be allowed
but only on condition that the applicants make the
changes outlined above in the use of their water in
accordance with their testimony on that question
so that such changes into storage and use on other
lands will be made without increasing the amount
or quantity of water consumed under such changes
over the amount and quantity of water which
would have been consumed had no change in the
use been made. (Italics ours)
The language above quoted from the East Bench
case is, we submit, particularly appropriate to the issues
here and we have emphasized the use of the word ''consumed" for that reason. And we also believe that the
trial court, in its findings, conclusions and decree, has
lost sight of the real significance of an approval of an
application by the State Engineer. This approval in no
sense establishes a right but merely permits the applicant to proceed with his proposed plan, and all of the
cases that we have cited place emphasis upon this. As
we will hereafter demonstrate, the trial court has gone
beyond what the State Engineer had power to do and
has adjudicated water rights, priorities and other
matters that were not necessary for its decision here.
May we again say that the only matter before the State
Engineer and before the trial court was the question as
to whether there was probable cause to believe that the
change as proposed by the United States could be made
without impairment of the rights of others.
As we pointed out in the Statement of :B"lacts, this
case has been before this Court before upon the petition
of the United States for the issuance of an extraordinary
1B
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writ, which was denied. The opinion of this Court had
occasion to discuss the problem here presented and in
Un.ited States v. District Court, supra, and on page 1137
of 238, Pacific Reporter 2d Series, this Court said :
The engineer in granting an application does not
determine that the applicant's rights are prior
to the rights of the protestant but only finds there
is reason to believe that the application may be
granted and some water beneficially used thereunder without interfering with the rights of
others. Under such a holding, the Engineer rejects applications only when it is clear that the
applicant can establish no valuable rights thereunder, he does not adjudicate claims but decides
only that there is probable cause to believe that
applicant may be able to establish rights under
his application without impairing the rights of
others. Such a decision is administrative in nature and purpose and the decision of the court on
review, except for the formalities of the trial and
judgment is of the same nature and for the same
purpose. The object of the engineer's office is to
maintain order and efficiency in the appropriation, distribution and conservation of water and
to allow as much water to be beneficially used as
possible. So construed, the law provides a period
of experimentation during which ways and means
may be sought to make beneficial use of more
water under the application before the rights of
the parties are finally adjudicated. If we were to
finally adjudicate applicant's right to change or
to appropriate water at the time that such application was rejected or approved, he would get
only such rights as he could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he could use beneficially without interfering with the rights of
others and in such hearing he would not have the

14
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benefit of any opportunity to experiment and
demonstrate what he could do. Such a system
would cut off the possibility of establishing many
valuable rights without a chance to demonstrate
what could be done.
And again on page 1138 this Court said :
The United States answered the protests stating
that it proposed to use only such waters as it
could use without interfering with the rights of
such plaintiffs and offered to modify its application so as to protect such rights. After a hearing
before the State Engineer, the United States
modified its application in accordance with its
interpretation of the evidence and such offer by
reducing the quantity of water which it applied
to change from 43.292 cubic feet per second ( c.f.s.)
to 10.30 c.f.s. The engineer approved the application subject to all rights which might be adversely affected. Thus it is clear that the engineer's decision did not purport to determine how
much water the applicant could redivert and use
from the Provo River without impairing the
rights of others, but merely found that there was
reason to believe that some of such waters could
be so rediverted and used. Such approval of the
change of place of diversion and use was expressly
limited to such waters as could be so rediverted
and used without impairing the rights of others.
May we add that the actual amount of the water that
could be so diverted and used in the present case could
not and would not be determinable until after the plan
of the applicant had been put into effect and the proof
of such use submitted to the State Engineer.
We respectfully submit that Findings of Fact Nos.
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11 and 12 and Nos. 12 and 13, respectively, in the Court
below and quoted in full on pages 3 and 4 of this brief
conclusively sho·w that the applications here involved
were properly approved by the State Engineer, and that
this approval should have been affirmed by the Distrirt
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COUH~r RECEIVED EVIDENCE
AND MADE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN
EXCESS OF FrS POWER SO TO DO AND ENTERED
JUDGl\IENT ACCORDINGLY. THAT CONCLUSION
.NO. 4 AND THE PARAGRAPH NUl\IBERED 4 OF
TI-IE JUDGl\1:ENT IN BOTH CASES BELOW ARE
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE
ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED AND HEARD BY THE STATE ENGINEER
AND THEREFORE ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
We are concerned here with Section 73-3-14 and
73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; Section 14 provides
for civil actions in the district court for plenary review
of decisions of the State Engineer. Section 15 provides
that ''the hearing in the district court shall pr oceed as
a trial de novo and shall be tried to the court as other
equitable actions." The question then presents itself as
to how far the district court may go in the introduction
of evidence concerning the application before it. We
should again bear in mind that the sole question for
decision is as to whether there is probable cause to
believe that these change applications may or may not
be approved without impairing other rights. It is, of
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course, impossible to demonstrate with any reasonable
positiveness that what is proposed will have this or that
definite effect and the importance of the words "probable
cause'' thus becomes apparent.
The plaintiff protestants in this case sought to and
did introduce a very considerable amount of evidence
dealing with fault zones, with brecciated areas, with bank
storage, and with the raising of the water table around
the perimeter of the reservoir. None of this evidence
was presented in terms of second-feet or acre-feet, but
only that there might be some loss of water by reason
of these elements.
Also, the record in this case is full of reference to
"savings" and "savings applications." This is a misnomer, as no savings application is involved and no question of saving of water is involved. The United States
sought by the change applications here to make other use
of the water that had theretofore been consumed by
transpiration and evaporation 011 the land inundated,
but they did not make any savings of any water as the
term should be properly used; and we believe that any
reference to savings in this record should be carefully
examined and in almost every instance the reference
should either be to water theretofore consumed or to
the change applications themselves. A savings application seeks to appropriate water, not to change its place
and nature of use.
This Court has discussed the problem here presented
in United States v. District Court, supra, and in the
denial of a petition for rehearing of that same case, and
also in Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362, in
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Tatnner u. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, and in
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P. 2d 748.
In Eardley v. Terry, supra, an applicant appealed
to the district court from a decision of the State Engineer rejecting an application to appropriate water from
Beaver Dam \Vash. The district court reversed the State
Engineer, ordered the application approved and then
proceeded to adjudicate to the parties their respective
water rights. On appeal to this Court, the action of the
trial court in approving the application was affirmed
but the adjudication procedure was disallowed and
ordered deleted as "the court had no power in the cause
to decree to the respondent (applicant) any water he may
be able to obtain in the future by conserving and increasing the flow of the stream involved.'' In discussing
the power of the State Engineer and that of the district
rourt on appeal, this Court said:

''It should be remembered that the proceeding
in the district court was by way of appeal from
the decision of the state engineer rejecting respondent's application to appropriate water.
Under the statute, section 100-3-8, R.S. Utah 1933,
when an application is filed, the state engineer is
required to determine whether there is unappropriated water in the proposed source of supply
and whether the water sought to be appropriated
can be put to a beneficial use and can be diverted
from the source of supply without doing material
injury to the prior rights of others. While the
statute, R.S. 1933, 100-3-7, also provides for the
filing of protests to any application to appropriate
water, this does not enlarge the scope of the proceedings before the state engineer beyond the
determination of the question above stated. The
18
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state engineer is required to determine whether
the application should be rejected or approved
by a consideration of the elements above stated.
He does not, and has no authority in such proceeding, to fix and determine the rights of the parties
to the proceeding. He simply determines whether
there is unappropriated water which can be beneficially used without injury to or conflict with
prior rights. If the application is approved, the
applicant must thereafter construct his works,
make beneficial use, and, by actual use of the
water, fix the nature and limits of the rights
which can be claimed and granted under the
application. The approval or rejection of the
application is simply a preliminary rna tter and is
not intended to, and does not, fix the rights of the
parties before the state engineer in such proceeding. When an appeal is taken from the decision of the state engineer in such a case, the trial
court is required to determine the same questions
de novo. It determines "'hether the application
should be approved or rejected and does not fix
the rights of the parties beyond the determination
of that matter. The issues remain the same upon
an appeal to this court. An that the district court
or this court, on appeal from the district court,
is called upon to do is to determine whether the
application should be rejected or approved. If it
appears that there is unappropriated water which
the applicant seeks to appropriate and which he
can beneficially use without injury to or conflict
with the prior rights of others, then the application should be approved by the court ; otherwise,
it should be rejected. If the application is approved, then the applicant must proceed to perfect his appropriation as provided by law and
make proof thereof under section 100-3-16, R.S.
1933. Until it is so perfected, he cannot be decreed
or giY('ll present rights as under a completed
19
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appropriation. It may be that, although the application is approved, the applicant may not be
able to perfect his appropriation. The mere approval of the application does not assure that an
actual appropriation of water will result.
Were section 100-3-8, R.S. 1933, to be considered by itself, it might be thought that in determining whether an application to appropriate
water should be approved, or rejected, the state
engineer, and the district court upon an appeal
from the state engineer's decision, should proceed
to hear and dispose of the matter and impose
upon the applicant the same burdens as if it were
making a final disposition of. all questions growing out of the filing of the application. But section
100-3-8, supra, does not stand alone. Sections
100-3-16 and 100-3-17 must be considered in connection therewith. By those sections it is clear
that no final rights are acquired until the proof
required by section 1003-16 is made and a certificate has been issued by the state engineer. Section 100-3-16 contemplates that the works, by
which the water applied for must be put to a beneficial use before a completed appropriation giving
rights to the use of the water can be effected. It
is also clear that the original approval of the state
engineer has no efficacy except that it shows that
the applicant had the right to proceed with his
application. Furthermore, it must be conceded
that any adjudication involved in the approval by
the state engineer of an application cannot be
carried over to the proceedings on final proof as
a binding determination of such issues raised by
the final proof as would be said to be involved in
approving the application.''
In Tanner v. Bacon, supra, the applicant again appealed from a decision of the State Engineer rejecting
20
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an application. The rejection in this case was on the
ground that approval would have been detrimental to
the public welfare in that it would have been a serious
obstacle to the Deer Creek project. The district court
again reversed the State Engineer and ordered the application approved but made that approval and the application subject to the filings upon which the Deer Creek
project was based. This Court affirmed and held that
such approval on condition was proper and was not an
enlargement of authority as the State Engineer was
vested with the same right and power. The following
language seems appropriate :
"These statutes may not vest the state with the
proprietary ownership of the water but they
clearly do enjoin upon the state the duty to control the appropriation of the public waters in a
manner that -..vill be for the best interests of the
public. The precise question involved in this case
has never been passed on by this court but similar
questions have been before the courts of other
states, under statutes much like ours, where it
has been invariably held that the state may
reject or limit applications to appropriate its unappropriated waters. Young & Norton v. Hinderlinder, supra; In re Commonwealth Power Co.,
94 Neb. 613, 143 N.W. 937; Kirk v. State Board of
Irrigation, 90 Neb. 627, 134 N.W. 167; Cookingham v. Lewis, 58 Or. 484, 114 P. 88, 115 P. 342;
In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 144 P. 505, 146 P.
475; East Bay Utility District v. Department of
Public Works, 1 Cal. 2d 476, 35 P. 2d 1027, 1029."
The case of Whitmore '1'. JJ1urray City, supra, was
an action for declaratory judgment as to priorities following approval by the State Engineer of an applica21
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tion filed by Murray City to change the points of diversion and return of water under its power filings. This
Court discussed the powers of the State Engineer and
said:
''A literal reading of the portion of the above
section which we have italicized would lead one
to believe that the determination of the state
engineer, approving or denying an application for
change of point of diversion adjudicated the rights
of parties, since the act provides, that no such
change shall be made 'if it impairs any vested
right, without just compensation,' and it would
appear that a necessary implication is that the
state engineer must determine the existence or
nonexistence of such vested rights before he acts,
and that when he does act and approves an application, that in so doing he has found that no vested
rights are impaired. However, such a construction would fail to take cognizance of the purposes
of our Water and Irrigation Act and the rights
and duties of the state engineer as there set out.
The office of state engineer was not created to
adjudicate vested rights between parties, but to
administer and supervise the appropriation of the
waters of the state. In Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah
367, 77 P. 2d 362, this court considered the rights
and duties of the state engineer in approving or
denying an application for appropriation of water
rights and we there held that in fulfilling his duties
he acts in an administrative capacity only and has
no authority to determine rights of parties. The
same reasoning applies to the extent of the state
engineer's authority when he determines to grant
or deny an application for change of diversion,
use or place. It follows that in granting Murray
City the right to change its point of diversion and
return,the state engineer did not adjudicate the
22
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priority to the use of the water at that point of
diversion, but merely determined that it could
use the water at that point as long as it did not
interfere with the prior rights of others. The
determination of the priority of rights is a judicial function and not among the powers of the
state engineer."
In the first United States v. District Court, supra,
at page 1136 of the Pacific Reporter, this Court said:
''The district court's judgment in reviewing
the engineer's decision is limited to the issues
determinable by the engineer and in general has
the same effect as though it were made by him.
The question to be determined is whether or not
under the facts established in that court the engineer's decision should be upheld or reversed
taking into account the statutory powers of the
engineer but the court may not determine issues
not within the power of the engineer to determine.
In the case of an application to appropriate or to
change the place of diversion or use, it merely
approves or rejects the application without determining the priorities of the parties, although
often the facts recorded or hsown by the engineer's records may be conclusive as to the priorities of the rights of the parties. Usually, the
date of the application determines its priority
on the basis of the first in time is first in right
but this is not always so. Plaintiff's counsel cites
Eardley v. Terry, supra, and quotes from Whitmore v. Murray, supra (107 Utah 445, 154 P. 2d
750), to the effect that 'The office of state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights
between parties, * * *' and that 'The determination of the priority of rights is a judicial function
and not among the powers of the state engineer.'
He seems to conclude therefrom that the (1eci-
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sions of the engineer are administrative but
those of the court in reviewing them somehow
become a judicial function. The import of these
cases are exactly opposite from that conclusion.
Whether or not we call the engineer's decision
administrative and the district court's decision
judicial, no rights to the use of water accrue by
the mere approving or rejecting of an application, the only thing thereby determined is whether
the applicant may proceed in accordance with the
statute to perfect the right applied for. Riordan
v. Westwood, Utah, 203 P. 2d 922."
In the second United States v. District Conrt, supra,
the defendants, although the successful parties in the
first case, sought the rehearing,and the following language clearly delineates the claims made and the ruling
of this court thereon :
"Defendants further contend that some language of the opinion should be reconsidered because
it involves questions not before the court and not
argued. That language in substance holds that
the judgment of the district court on an appeal
from the State Engineer's decision only decided
issues which the Engineer could have decided and
such decision has no more force nor effect than
the same decision would have had if made by the
Engineer; that neither determines nor adjudicates
the extent or priority of the claims of either the
applicant or protestants, that each determine
only whether to approve or reject the application
based on whether or not it finds reason to believe
that the application can be approved and the
change to some extent effected without impairing
the rights of others. Of course, in determining
such question the claims of both the applicant and
protestants must be considered but this does not
24
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require that such claims must be adjudicated.
Some of such claims may have already been adjudicated and in making such decision this must be
taken into consideration; others may be somewhat
speculative and doubtful and such claims do not
have to be adjudicated before reaching a decision,
for the decision is based on law and facts which
are required to only show reason to believe, and
not on definite findings or conclusions of fact or
law. The Engineer is an executive officer, he is
not required to be trained in the law nor competent to pass on or adjudicate such legal questions.
The protestants, both in the hearing before
the Engineer and hy their pleading in the district
court, raise highly technical legal questions, and
on appeal seek to adjudicate the extent of the
right of the United States to use the water c]aimed
by it and the priority as between it and the protestants to such use. They claim that their rights
are prior to the rights of the predecessors of the
United States, that they consented to the use of
such waters by such predecessors only if used
on the lands now covered by the waters of the
Deer Creek Reservoir where they would receive
the benefit of the return flow and that under the
circumstances surrounding the construction of
the Deer Creek Reservoir the United States abandoned its right to the use of such waters and is
estopped from now asserting the right to divert
them at the new place of diversion. It is clear
from their pleadings that the protestants now
seek to adjudicate the rights of the United States
to the use of these waters at the new diversion
place, and do not concede that the decision on
whether to grant the application should be based
merely upon whether the court finds reason to
believe that such change will not impair their
rights. Of course, if they make a strong enough
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case so that there is no reason to believe that the
change can be made without impairing existing
rights, it will be the duty of the court to deny
the application, even though it does not adjudicate such rights.
Defendants correctly assert that they did not
argue the questions discussed in the language
objected to. But the United States, contrary to
our decision, argued that the so called appeal to
the district court is a new and different action
from the one determined by the Engineer, and
that many issues which the Engineer refused, was
not qualified, and had no jurisdiction to determine
will, under the pleadings in this case be adjudicated in the distrirt court, and thus the United
States will haYe been sued contrary to its sovereign immunity without consenting thereto. The
defendants in their arguments did not answer
this contention, apparently conceding that the
issues before the district court would be greatly
enlarged on the appeal. But we carefully considered these arguments of the United States and
have grave doubts that if the issues may be so
expanded on the appeal to the district court that
such court can acquire jurisdiction to litigate
such matters against the United States on account
of its immunity as sovereign from being sued
without its consent. We also recognize that this
is not the court of last resort on that question but
the federal courts have the final word thereon.
We felt after studying the cases relied upon by
the United States that it had misconstrued them
to allow an enlargement of the issues on an
appeal from the Engineer's decision to the court.
We had no doubt that if the issues on such an
appeal are limited to the issues before the State
Engineer, then Congress has required the Reclamation Department to submit to such an appeal.
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Without reaching this conclusion, there is no
basis for our decision found in the opinion. To
arrive at our decision, we had to rely upon the
conclusion reached in the language objected to in
our decision or decide other questions which we
did not feel were necessary to decide in view of
the conclusion reached by such language. So
those questions were before us and necessary for
our decision under the view we adopted. A modification of the language complained of in accordance with defendants' petition would require us
to determine the question of whether the United
States is immune from a suit to determine its
right to the use of this water which we were not
required to determine under the view we took.
The reasons supporting the conclusions objected to are sound. The term" appeal" indicates
a re-examination by a higher tribunal of issues
determined in the original trial, or at least issues
which could have been so determined. It is a misnomer to call it an appeal where the appellate
tribunal may hear and determine issues which the
original could not have determined and where
such determination has the effect of adjudicating
such issues which could not be adjudicated by the
decision of the original officer or tribunal. We
know of no case of an appeal from the decision
of an executive board or officer where the appellate tribunal adjudicates new issues not within
the jurisdiction of the original tribunal to determine.
If we are correct in our conclusion that the
district court on an appeal from the Engineer's
decision only decides issues which the Engineer
could have decided and that it does not adjudicate
any rights except those on which the Engineer's
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decision is final unless it is set aside, then the
district court on this appeal cannot adjudicate
the extent or priority of the right of the United
States to the use of this water. The statute makes
no provision for the determination of the priorities of the applicant and the protestants or the
extent of their rights. It merely requires an
approval or rejection of the application and, if
approved, authorizes the applicant to proceed
with his proposed work and forbids him to proceed if rejected. See Sec. 100-3-10, U.C.A. 1943.
It leaves the adjudication of the rights which the
applicant may have or may acquire under the
application, and the rights of the protestants, to
the courts in another kind of a proceeding and
not to the Engineer who is merely an executive
officer. Neither the decision of the Engineer nor
of the court on an appeal therefrom are based
on a determination of the facts or the law applicable thereto but the application must be approved
in both cases if the tribunal concludes that there
is reason to believe that no existing right will
thereby be impaired. * * •"
We respectfully submit that the evidence presented
was improper, that it sought a balancing of accounts as
between the parties prematurely and that it involved
matters of law with respect to the rights of the parties.
The State Engineer could not and did not rule upon
these matters and it was not proper for the trial court
to have passed upon them.

CONCLUSION
It is our contention that there was only one issue
presented to the district court namely, could the appli28
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cant, the United States, change the point of diversion,
place and nature of use of the water here involved without impairment of the rights of lower users. The trial
court found that this amount of water under prereservoir
conditions was consumed and was lost to the river and
to the lower users and it is not possible to conceive of a
situation wherein these lower users could be hurt by a
change of this water. And it is our further contention
that the conclusion as to the loss of water through leakage, seepage, evaporation and transpiration was not a
proper consideration for the trial court, that it broadened
the issues beyond the scope of the State Engineer and
attempts to adjudicate the rights of the parties prematurely.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed and that the applications
should be approved but limited specifically to the amount
of water actually found by the trial court to have been
consumed and lost to the river under the conditions that
existed before construction of Deer Creek Reservoir.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
ROBERT B. PORTER
Assistant Attorney General
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